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The Productivity Commission (2008) identified waiting times for elective surgery as a 
measure of governments’ success in providing accessible health care. At the 2007 
COAG meeting, the Prime Minister identified reduction of elective surgery waiting 
times in public hospitals as a major policy priority. To date the analysis of waiting 
time data has been limited to summary statistics by medical procedure, doctor 
specialty and state. In this paper we look behind the summary statistics and analyse 
the extent to which private patients are prioritised over comparable public patients in 
public hospitals. Our empirical evidence is based on waiting list and admission data 
from public hospitals in NSW for 2004-2005. We find that private patients have 
substantially shorter waiting times, and tend to be admitted ahead of their listing rank, 
especially for procedures that have low urgency levels. We also explore the benefits 










The Australian healthcare system relies on public and private funding and public and 
private provision of health services. Public funding, primarily derived from taxation, 
provides subsidised health care services to all residents. Private funding is in the form 
of patients’ direct out of pocket health expenditures or though private health insurance 
funds. Patients receiving free treatments at public hospitals are referred to as public or 
Medicare patients. Private hospital treatment can occur in either private or public 
hospitals and generally involves disadvantages (such as positive gap payments) and 
advantages unavailable to public patients (such as choice of treating doctors and 
higher quality accommodation). While most private patients choose to go to private 
hospitals for treatment, in 2006-2007 about 18% of private treatment was performed 
in public hospitals (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), 2008). These 
patients could be attracted by lower expenses for hospital and medical care, and for 
insurance plans restricted to public hospitals; however they must go on the waiting list 
for treatment along with public patients and so wait longer for admission compared 
with treatment in a private hospital.  
Waiting lists are the most common means of rationing demand for non-emergency, or 
elective, procedures in public health care systems where prices are essentially zero. 
Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Canada and Scandinavian countries are 
among those countries that use public hospital waiting lists for elective procedures in 
this way. In principal, the operation of public hospital waiting lists should reflect 
clinical need, with patients most in need facing shorter waits. In fact, a key aspect of 
the five-yearly Australian Health Care Agreements between the Commonwealth and 
states is to regulate equity considerations in terms of access to public hospital 
treatments. There is anecdotal evidence, however, that non-clinical factors influence 
waiting list dynamics and financial incentives for providers (both public hospitals and 
medical practitioners) result in private patients receiving preferential treatment. 
Funding for the treatment of public patients in public hospitals is constrained by fixed 
budgets and increasing the share of privately financed hospital activities is one of the 
few ways public hospitals can generate additional revenues. Thus, there are incentives 
for public hospitals to treat patients differently. Indeed, revenues to state governments 
through private patients’ beds in public hospitals have been increasing steadily 
(Private Health Insurance Administration Council (PHIAC), 2004 and 2006); between 
2003–2004 and 2005–2006, insurance benefits paid to public hospitals in NSW and 
ACT grew by 17% compared to those to private hospitals which grew by 10%. 
Similarly in Victoria, the growth in insurance benefits for public hospital beds was 
38%, whilst payments for private hospitals grew by just 11%. 
Doctors in public hospitals also have financial incentives to increase the throughput of 
private patients. Both Salaried Specialists and Visiting Medical Officers can admit 
private patients to public hospitals. In admitting private patients, they will derive fee-
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for-service revenues in addition to their public sector salary or sessional payments for 
treating public patients.  
Many studies use difference in waiting times to motivate their analysis of people’s 
preference of private over public health treatment (e.g., Besley et al., 1999; Costa and 
Garcia, 2003; Moorin and Holman, 2006; Colombo and Tapay, 2004; Dawson et al., 
2006). However, analysis most commonly focuses on a comparison of waiting times 
for public hospital treatment compared with treatment in private hospitals. There is 
very little empirical evidence concerning the treatment of private and public patients 
within the public system.  
Furthermore, existing public reports (e.g., Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 
2008) and international comparisons (e.g., Siciliani and Hurst, 2003), which are 
referred to by these studies are based on aggregate analyses and summary statistics. 
Aggregate figures however obscure variations in the experiences of patients that are 
central to understanding the waiting list dynamics and the choice between public and 
private treatment. The aim of this study is to fill this gap in the literature by 
conducting disaggregated analysis based on patient status. Further, we analyse the 
entire distribution of patients on the waiting lists, providing far richer information 
than commonly presented point estimates, such as the sample mean or median. 
In this paper, we analyse the extent to which private patients are prioritised over 
public patients who share the same clinical needs. We explore the empirical 
distribution of waiting times by patient status and use an ordinal approach based on 
two patient ranks: (i) their entry rank (when they are listed for a planned procedure) 
and (ii) their exit rank (when they are admitted to hospital). Our empirical evidence is 
based on waiting list and admission data from public hospitals in NSW for the period 
2004-2005. The data are derived from inpatient and matched waiting list data from 
public hospitals in NSW consisting of patients on the waiting list who completed their 
hospital stay during the period 2004-2005. We focus on Medicare-eligible acute 
patients whose admission status was either public (non-charge) or private; other 
categories such as Veteran’s Affairs, Defence Forces and Worker’s Compensation are 
excluded. In total, there are 234,483 admissions, 87% of which are for public patients. 
We define clinically similar patients as either those assigned the same recommended 
maximum time to admission (termed urgency) or the same planned hospital 
procedure. To control for supply side factors affecting access, we undertake separate 
analyses for 3 categories of hospitals. Both within urgency categories and planned 
procedures and for different categories of hospitals, we show that the empirical 
distribution of public patients’ waiting times are always below the corresponding 
distribution for private patients, indicating higher proportions of public patients were 
delayed in their admissions. We obtain consistent findings based on ranks: private 
patients tend to be admitted ahead their listing rank. Using a counterfactual exercise, 
we calculate the extent to which prioritisation of private patients affects both their 
waiting times and those of comparable public patients.  
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2. Urgency, procedures and hospitals 
To produce meaningful public-private patient comparisons, we must be comparing 
clinically similar patients. We define clinical needs of a patient using two indicators: 
assigned urgency and planned procedures. Urgency status indicates the maximum 
time that the patient should wait before admission to hospital. It is determined by the 
specialist responsible for placing the patient on the waiting list. In most jurisdictions 
in Australia there are three urgency categories: 30 days, 90 days and 365 days. The 30 
days urgency status is for ‘a condition that has the potential to deteriorate quickly to 
the point that it may become an emergency’. The 90 days urgency status is for 
conditions that are ‘not likely to deteriorate quickly or become an emergency’. Lastly, 
the 365 days urgency is for conditions that ‘do not have the potential to become an 
emergency’. This system appears to be the most endorsed rule by both patients and 
medical practitioners internationally (Oudhoff et al., 2007). NSW public hospitals 
however also use 7 days urgency classification. We treat patients in each urgency 
category as clinically comparable in terms of the desired waiting time.  
For planned procedures, we select four common treatments: cataract extraction, knee 
replacement, removal of skin lesion and colonoscopy. Furthermore, these procedures 
are unique to a given specialty within a hospital; e.g., cataract in ophthalmology, and 
removal of skin lesion in general or plastic. We assume that patients waiting for the 
same procedure are to this extent comparable. 
To control for supply side factors which may impact on waiting times we undertake 
our analyses separately for three types of hospital. Following the AIHW, hospitals can 
be categorised to 3 broad groups: (i) group A hospitals, consisting of principal referral 
hospitals (A1) and specialist women and children hospitals (A2); (ii) group B 
hospitals, consisting of large major cities hospitals (B1) and large regional and remote 
hospitals (B2); and (iii) group C hospitals, consisting of medium major cities and 
regional hospitals (C1, C2). The other type of hospitals that treat acute patients is 
small acute hospitals (D1). As there are only few patients in our data who were 
admitted at this type of hospital, we pool them together with patients in the group C 
hospitals. All of group A and B hospitals are located in major cities or inner regions 
of NSW while some group C/D hospitals are located in outer regions of NSW 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2008).  
There is lacking priori on how different patients are treated in different hospitals. In 
term of number of beds, the group A hospitals have more beds than group B and C 
hospitals. However, it is not clear if this would translate to better waiting list outcome 
for public patients. In a related study based on the British NHS, Siciliani et al. (2009) 
suggest that waiting times may be longer in bigger hospitals. Their study examines the 
relationship between hospital costs, which is positively related to number of beds, and 
waiting times and find that, if any, the relationship between waiting times and hospital 
costs is a positive one. On the other hand, Martin and Smith (2003) find a strong 
positive supply-side response to long waiting times. If bigger hospitals have more 
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resources, then their result would be consistent with the bigger hospitals having better 
management of patients. 
3. Methodology 
In the first approach, we first follow the convention and derive differences in the 
sample mean and median waiting times of public and private patients sharing the 
same observed clinical needs. However, to be more informative than these point 
estimates, we also plot the empirical distributions of waiting times for each type of 
patient.   
Let { }nW,...W,W 21  be the observed of waiting times of n  patients with either public or 
private status who were admitted in a given year (i.e., have completed waiting). In a 
sub-sample of patients with the same clinical needs, we compute the empirical 
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same probability.   
From (1), we can also infer they incidence of waiting times beyond a certain threshold 












1111   ( private public,=k ) 
where τ  is a threshold value of interest, and τkjn  is the sample size up to that 
threshold point. A natural threshold would be the recommended admission time given 
by urgency category, such as 30 days in urgency category of 30 days, in which case, 
(2) would indicate the proportion of overdue cases. However, (2) is generic, and is not 
restricted to this interpretation (e.g., τ  could be 180 days in 90 days urgency category 
and so indicate the proportion of patients waiting more than double the recommended 
time).  
The second approach is inspired by a common technique in the public finance 
literature for analysing horizontal equity issues (e.g., King, 1983; Lairson et al., 
1995). As in the first approach, it is based on ordered statistics, but not according to 
the length of waiting times. Instead, the method is based on the position (rank) of 
patients as they enter and exit the waiting list. The focus of this approach is equity as 
it defines a “desirable outcome”, which is admission of clinically comparable patients 
to hospital treatment in the same order that they were listed for treatment. Reordering 
of patients between the entry rank and exit rank suggests horizontal inequity: that is, 
non-clinical factors are influencing the admission rank. 
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More specifically, all patients with the same clinical needs, regardless of their patient 
status, are ordered by their listing date, and their orders in the sample give their entry 
ranks. If on any one day, multiple patients are listed, then each of them is assigned the 
same rank. To illustrate, suppose there are five patients entering the waiting list, and 
the second and third person both enter on the second day. The rank of these patients in 
order would be {1, 2, 2, 4, 5}. The largest rank therefore is equal to the sample size. 
In a similar manner, an exit rank is created using the admission date on which a 
patient is removed from the list. In a graphical representation, the ideal scenario of 
admission according to entry rank would trace out a 45-degree line. That is, a 
patient’s exit rank is in accordance to his/her entry rank. With the entry ranks plotted 
on the vertical axis and the exit ranks plotted on the horizontal axis, observations 
below the 45-degree line (negative deviations) would indicate the type of patients who 
tend to receive preferential treatments and are admitted ahead of their listing ranks. 
Conversely, observations that are above the 45-degree line represent those patients 
who are admitted behind their ranks. 
As a counterfactual exercise, we finally determine the extent to which public patients’ 
waiting times are reduced and private patients’ waiting times increased, were there no 
preferential treatment to private patients and all patient were admitted to hospital 
according to their listing rank. For each urgency case and selected procedure, we 
compute: 


























where kjθ  is the sample mean difference between the actual and counterfactual 
waiting times for clinical need j  and patient type k ; iW  and kjn  are as previously 
defined; en  is the number of patients with entry rank e; and 
e
rW  is the waiting time of 
the patient with exit rank e were they also to be admitted to hospital with the same 
rank. To summarise, the counterfactual compares each patient’s actual waiting time 
with the waiting time they would have experienced if their exit rank matched their 
listing rank.  
Given erW , we can also compute the analog to (1) the empirical distribution for each 
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4.  Results  
Table 1 presents mean and median waiting times for patients at different hospitals by 
patient status. These are the standard statistics reported on waiting times, although 
they have not been previously disaggregated by patient status. Mean waiting times are 
always much larger than the corresponding medians, reflecting substantial positive 
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skewness in waiting times. Nevertheless, by any measure, except for the 7 days 
urgency case, public patients wait considerably longer than private patients for all 
urgency categories and procedures and in all types of hospitals. For example, in the 90 
day urgency category, public patients wait about twice as long as private patients and 
in the 365 day urgency category the average waiting time can be about three times as 
long as for private patients.  
Similarly for the selected procedures, public patients’ waiting times are longer than 
those of private patients. Public patients waiting for skin operation and colonoscopy 
wait on average over 2 weeks longer than their private patient counterparts. 
Differences in patients’ waiting times are even more pronounced for those waiting for 
cataract extraction or knee replacement. The median wait for private cataract patients 
in group A and C hospitals is 41 and 31 days, respectively, whilst the corresponding 
median wait for public cataract patients is 221 and 198 days. Public patients have to 
wait more than 300 days for a knee replacement in group A and B hospitals, which is 
more than twice as long that required of private patients.  
If private patients represented systematically more complex case, this could explain 
some of these differences. However, an investigation of patient characteristics 
indicates that this is unlikely to be the case. The age distribution of public patients lies 
to the right of that of private patients and they also have more diagnosed conditions. 
Both suggest that it is public patients that are likely to present more complex cases.  
[Insert Table 1: Mean and median waiting times] 
Figure 1 plots the empirical distribution of waiting times for public and private 
patients according to urgency levels and by hospital category. As some patients’ 
waiting times are extremely long, we top-code these values; the maximum values for 
urgency levels 7, 30, 90 and 365 days are 60, 100, 200 and 500 days respectively. The 
rows correspond to hospital group, A, B and finally C.   
[Insert Figure 1: Cumulative patient distribution by urgency assignment] 
The empirical distribution for public patients is always below that of private patients. 
Within any urgency case, a gap between the distributions of public and private 
patients can be interpreted as evidence of non-clinical prioritisation to private patients. 
As urgency declines, the patient gaps widen. This pattern shows that the greatest 
extent of patient discrimination is experienced by public patients who were assigned a 
less urgent category. The shapes of the patient distributions are similar across hospital 
groups for urgency levels 7 and 30 days, but are quite different for urgency levels of 
90 and 365 days. In group A and B hospitals, nearly 20% of public patients with 
assigned urgency of 90 days are still on the waiting list after 200 days and 10% of 
public patients with assigned urgency of 365 days have been listed for more than 500 
days. Almost no corresponding private patients undergo a similar experience. Indeed, 
three quarters of private patients with urgency status of 365 days were admitted 
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within 3 months. Meanwhile, the occurrence of long delays is less in group C 
hospitals. There, less than 5% of public patients with assigned urgency of 90 days 
remain on the waiting list for 200 days or longer and almost all public patients with 
assigned urgency of 365 days are admitted within 500 days. 
In each urgency category, a reference line indicates the cumulative plot at the 
threshold period; the intersection with the two plots indicates the incidence of overdue 
cases. Group A and B hospitals have much higher level of overdue cases than group C 
hospitals, especially for the less urgent categories. The shares of overdue public 
patients with assigned urgency of 90 days (30-40%) in these hospitals are more than 
double that of private patients (10-15%). Even more dramatic is the difference in the 
shares of overdue public patients with urgency of 365 days: the proportion of public 
patients overdue over 8 times that of private patients in group B hospitals. In group C 
hospitals, while there are also patient gaps, the extent of these gaps are comparatively 
modest. We report the proportion of overdue cases in Table 2.  
[Insert Table 2: Sample proportion of overdue admissions] 
The finding that public patients’ waiting times at group C hospitals are generally 
shorter than those at the bigger hospitals leading to narrower patient gaps is quite 
interesting. One may speculate that this has to do with distinct public-private patient 
mix and demand at regional areas. Alternatively, smaller hospitals may be more 
efficient than larger ones; the relationship between waiting times and scope 
economies need not be linear (Siciliani et al., 2009). 
Figure 2 plots the empirical distribution of waiting times for the selected procedures. 
For these cases, the reference lines are drawn according to the majority of urgency 
assignments for the given procedure: for the skin condition, most patients are assigned 
30 days urgency, for colonoscopy most patients are assigned 90 days urgency, and for 
cataract and knee replacement, most patients are assigned 365 days urgency. The 
intersection between the reference line and the cumulative plot indicates the 
proportion of patients who remain on the waiting lists for more than the most 
commonly recommended time for the procedure. The overdue incidence for these 
patients according to their own urgency level is reported in Table 2.   
[Insert Figure 2: Cumulative patient distribution for selected procedures] 
The patient gaps for cataract extraction and knee replacement are extreme. In group A 
and B hospitals, over 40% of public patients waiting for a knee replacement remain 
on the waiting list for more than a year and some 20-25% have been on the list for 
more than 500 days (around 50-60% are overdue according to own urgency class). In 
contrast, with a few exceptions, all private patients are admitted within a year. In 
group C hospitals, the share of public patients experiencing such a long wait is 
somewhat smaller than those found above in group A and B hospitals. Group C 
hospitals however appear to admit public cataract patients with somewhat shorter 
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waits than group A hospitals: over 80% of public patients within 12 months compared 
with 70% for group A hospitals. The small number of cataract and knee replacement 
patients in group B hospitals is due to most of these operations being performed in 
group A hospitals or specialised units, which are classified as group C. For the other 
two procedures, removal of skin lesion and colonoscopy, which tend to have higher 
urgency assignments, patient gaps exist but are more modest.   
The role of patient status is also clear in the rank-based analyses. Figure 3 present 
allocations of patients in different urgency class based on ranks. The rows again 
correspond to hospital group, A, B and finally C. Grey circles mark the positions of 
public patients, and black triangles mark the positions of private patients.  
[Insert Figure 3: Ranks based on urgency assignment] 
Of public and private patients who were assigned an urgency of 7 days, most 
observations are concentrated around the 45-degree line, indicating that admission 
rank is close to listing rank. This is perhaps consistent with the high chance that these 
patients could develop into an emergency. There are a number of exceptional patients 
who were admitted substantially behind their entry ranks, the majority being public 
patients. As the clinical urgency lengthens, the role of patient status becomes more 
pronounced, with many more private patients admitted ahead of their entry rank. The 
lower probability that these patients would develop emergency may provide larger 
leverage for the health providers to prioritise based on patient status. In the case of the 
30 day urgency category, private patients tend to be scattered around the 45-degree 
line with a higher proportion of public patients being located above the 45-degree 
line. In the case of the 90 day urgency category, most private patients are below the 
45-degree line. Lastly, in the case of the 365 days urgency category, the concentration 
of private patients is even further below the 45-degree line, especially in group B 
hospitals, indicating exit ranks that are considerably lower than entry ranks. Some 
public patients were admitted ahead of their ranks as well. However, the mass of 
public patients fill the upper triangle of the figure, indicating that the majority of them 
were admitted substantially behind their entry ranks. Comparing the hospital groups, 
group B hospitals perform the worst in term of orderly admission of patients to 
hospital treatments.  
Figures 4 present the rank-based results for selected procedures. The role of patient 
status is even more dramatic. For all four procedures, those admitted as private 
patients were almost always admitted considerably ahead of their entry ranks. The 
density of private patients’ waiting time for removal of skin lesion and colonoscopy 
however lies somewhat closer to the 45-degree line, than that observed in the case for 
cataract extraction and knee replacement. This pattern supports the view that 
procedures that attract private patients are procedures that have very long public 
patient waiting times (Wiley, 2001a). As for public patients, they again fill the area 
above the 45-degree line showing admission behind entry rank.  
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 [Insert Figure 4: Ranks for the selected procedures] 
Before proceeding to the counterfactual analysis, we test the sensitivity of our 
approach to sample imbalance as private patients are only a minority (13%) in public 
hospitals. We select randomly as many public patients as there are private patients in 
a given sub-sample to ensure that our results are not merely an artefact of this sample 
imbalance. Redoing all analyses based on these balanced sub-samples, we find that 
our substantive findings are robust to this concern.1  
The results for the counterfactual exercise are reported in Table 3. We find that, were 
patients admitted according to their entry rank, public patients’ waiting times would 
be slightly shorter (with time saving of less than a week), whilst private patients 
would be waiting for considerably longer periods.2 These small time savings 
predicted for public patients, at least based on mean estimates, are noteworthy, as 
even an orderly admission does not bring their mean waiting times to suit the clinical 
urgency of 30 and 90 days. When admitted according to their ranks, public patients 
with assigned urgency of 30 days wait on average 38-40 days, while those with 
assigned urgency of 90 days wait more than 105 days on average in group A and B 
hospitals.  
[Insert Table 3: Predicted effect of orderly admission according to ranks] 
Figure 5 show the empirical distributions for less urgent cases (90 days and 365 days), 
cataract and knee replacements in the counterfactual scenario. The redistribution 
(original) outcomes are indicated by the thinner (thicker) markers.  
[Insert Figure 5: Cumulative patient redistribution] 
We can see that orderly admission shifts the private patients’ curve downwards, 
closing the patient gaps. In all types of hospitals, the largest impact of redistribution 
appears to be observed among patients with urgency level of 90 days. Admission 
according to entry rank can reduce overdue incidences of public patients by almost 20 
percentage points in group A hospitals. To achieve this, 80% of private patients would 
be waiting some 20-30 days longer, but they would still be treated within the 
recommended period of 90 days. Half of public patients would also have longer 
waiting times, but the additional wait is smaller than that required of most private 
                                                 
1 The only cases where sample imbalance matters (i.e., the differences in two sample mean are 
significant at 5% significant level) are in group A hospitals for: mean wait for 7 days urgency, mean 
wait for removal of skin lesion, proportion of overdue for 365 days patients and proportions of overdue 
for knee replacement patients. In these cases, the balanced sample means and overdue proportions are 
larger than the full sample counterparts, widening the gap between public and private patients’ waiting 
times. Detailed results of these robustness checks are available on request. 
2 The high demand by public patients relative to private patients is part of the reason why public 
patients do not benefit substantially in terms of waiting time reduction even if they get admitted 
according to their rank. Unlike the balanced sample scenario, public patients face most competition 




patients. In the 365 days case, the redistribution affects 70-90% of private patients, 
depending on the type of hospital, and a smaller proportion of public patients 
experience longer waits in order to improve the waiting times for the remaining public 
patients. However, the overdue incidence is improved only by a small margin.  
For cataract and knee replacement patients, we also find that the orderly admissions 
have very little impact in reducing the waiting times of public patients. In the case of 
cataract extraction, in group A and C hospitals, the redistribution will affect at least 
90% of private patients, who would be waiting considerably longer, possibly twice the 
length of their actual wait. This, combined with some 30% of public patients who are 
admitted faster than the average waiting time for their ranks, would make the 
remaining 70% of public patients wait just slightly less. For a knee replacements, 
there are so many public patients with extremely long waiting times, that the 
redistribution is unable to improve the overly long delays in admission.   
 
5. Discussion 
Using the experience of public hospitals in NSW, we show large discrepancies in the 
waiting time experiences of private and public patients who share the same clinical 
needs; private patients are prioritised in admission and have substantially shorter 
waiting times. While the evidence we present in this paper is based on NSW hospitals, 
we believe that the results apply nationwide. In fact, on the basis of summary 
statistics, the performance of NSW public hospitals in terms of median waiting times 
and overly long delay cases are the best nationwide (Department of Health and 
Ageing, 2009). If so, our findings provide a lower benchmark. 
Financial incentives to health providers appear to have had an immense influence on 
timely access to health treatments by private patients, even in public hospital settings. 
Fixed public hospital budgets increase the attractiveness of privately financed 
activities. Likewise, numerous studies have shown that doctors, just like any other 
economic agents, respond to financial incentives (Conrad et al., 2002; Lungen et al., 
2007; Dusheiko et al., 2006). 
In our analysis, we assumed that clinical factors alone determined the assignment of 
urgency category by the doctor placing the patient on the waiting list. However, 
doctors may also increase the throughput of private patients by the urgency which is 
assigned. To investigate this, in Table 4 we compare urgency assignment by patient 
status. We find that urgency differs systematically: larger shares of public (private) 
patients were assigned with less (more) urgent categories. The proportions of private 
patients assigned with urgency of 30 days or less are always significantly greater than 
the corresponding figures for public patients. In contrast, the proportions of private 
patients assigned with urgency of 90 days or greater are always smaller than the 
corresponding figures for public patients. This distinction is found even within a 
sample of patients with the same planned procedure. More than 80% of public 
cataract patients are assigned urgency of 365 days, compared with less than 40% of 
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private cataract patients. These results, and those found above, are consistent with 
financial incentives being the main mechanism generating differences in the treatment 
of public and private patients.  
[Insert Table 4: Urgency assignment] 
6. Conclusion 
The scope to prioritise private patients is potentially constrained by the regulatory 
setting. Prior to 1998, one of the guiding principles contained in the Australian Health 
Care Agreements between the Commonwealth and the states specified that “access to 
public hospitals be on the basis of clinical need”. This was changed in subsequent 
agreements to “access to such services by public patients [emphasised added], free of 
charge, is to be on the basis of clinical need and within a clinically appropriate 
period” (Department of Health and Ageing, 2009). The change of wording introduced 
a difference in the principle guiding access to public hospital services for private and 
public patients. Specifically, it removed the Commonwealth’s oversight of equity of 
access by public and private patient status and expanded providers’ opportunities to 
respond to financial incentives by giving preferential treatment to private patients.  
Constrained budgets in NSW public hospitals have led to many problems, including 
closure of wards and operating theatres, bed shortages, unreliable supply of 
equipment and consumables, shortages of staff, low staff morale, errors in prescribing 
and administering medicines, poor infection control and preventable deaths (Garling, 
2008). Allowing priority to private patients in times of severe budget constraints may 
further exacerbate shortcomings in the care of public patients in public hospitals. 
Overly long delays of medical treatment in turn can have negative consequences on 
the patients, both physically and mentally (Hikhuysen et al., 2005; Anderson et al., 
2007; Ostendorf et al., 2004). 
We find substantial prioritisation of private patients in public hospitals in NSW in 
2004-05 and this preferential treatment to private patients can explain some of the 
overly long delays in treatments of public patients. However, we also find that public 
patients would experience long waiting times even in the absence of prioritisation. If 
major health reform is to be successful, it should address the funding arrangements 
which place severe constraints on funding for the treatment of public patients in 
public hospitals and the current financial incentives which generate preferential 
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